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Family Code §§ 9300, 9306 (amended).
SB 970 (Rosenthal); 1993 STAT. Ch. 266
Under existing law, adults' may be adopted following certain adoption
procedures. 2  Existing law also provides that the legal parent-child
relationship between the adopted person and the birth parents3 is severed
once the adult is adopted.4
1. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6501 (West 1993) (defining an adult as a person who is 18 years old or
older).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 230.10 (West Supp. 1993); see id. § 230.12 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting a
person from adopting more than one adult per year, unless the adoptee is a sibling of another adoptee or is
physically handicapped); id. § 230.20(a)-(g) (West Supp. 1993) (explaining the procedures for getting a court
approved adoption of an adult, and obtaining spouse approval for such an adoption); Schaefer v. Sewall, 242
Cal. App. 2d 208, 218, 51 Cal. Rptr. 367, 376 (1966) (holding that an heir may move to set aside an adult
adoption decree perpetrated by fraud so long as the adopting parent had the right to do so during that parent's
lifetime); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6152(a) (Vest 1991) (stating that adopted persons are included in terms
of class gifts or relationships in accordance with the laws governing inheritance rights when dealing with
intestate succession matters unless otherwise provided in the will or unless the relationship falls within California
Probate Code § 6152(b)); In re Zook, 62 Cal. 2d 492, 495, 399 P.2d 53, 55, 42 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600 (1965)
(noting that an adult adoptee inherits from his adoptive parents just as a natural child would); hz re Stanford,
49 Cal. 2d 120, 135, 315 P.2d 681, 689 (1957) (noting that state policy, as evidenced by the adoption statutes,
is to give adoptees the same rights as natural children, including inheritance rights); Christopher H. Hall,
Adoption as Precluding Testamentary Gift Under Natural Relative's Will, 71 A.L.R.4th 374, 400 (1989)
(explaining that, in cases where a court has precluded an adoptee from sharing in a testamentary gift of a natural
relative, the court has found support for its decision in a state statute concerning the character of the legal
relationship between an adoptee and the adoptee's natural and adoptive parents, and the court has not made any
reference to an adoptee's right to receive property through either testacy or intestacy); K.M. Potraker, Adoption
of Adult, 21 A.L.R. 3d 1012, 1034-35 (1968) (listing cases in which an adult adoptee has been considered a legal
heir of an adoptive parent); cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.21(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1993) (setting forth the conditions
which must be met before a child is considered to be placed for adoption); Delaney v. First National Bank, 386
P.2d 711,714-15 (N.M. 1963) (giving full faith and credit to a Colorado adult adoption, although New Mexico
law would not have permitted such an adoption, since the adopting parent and the adoptee were less than 20
years apart in age).
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 220.20(d) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a birth parent as the biological parent).
4. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9306(a) (amended by Chapter 266); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.76 (West Supp.
1993) (providing that birth parents relinquish all rights and obligations towards a child when the child is
adopted); id. § 230.16 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that the birth parents are relieved of all of their parental rights
and duties once the adult adoptee is adopted); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 919(a)-(b) (1981) (stating that when
an adoption decree is issued, the child will no longer be considered the child of his birth parents, and the
adoptive parents will assume the role of the child's parents). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 229.50 (West Supp.
1993) (stating that a licensed agency may arrange for contact between an adult adoptee and his or her birth
parent if a consent has been filed by each of them); but cf. Michels v. Weingartner, 848 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Kan.
1993) (holding that a natural father is still responsible for past due child support, even though a stepparent has
adopted the child). See generally Pat O'Brien, A Right to Know Their Roots, NEWSDAY, May 25, 1993, at 77
(commending the Governor of New York for considering the proposal to change the adoption law so that
adoptees can obtain information about their birth parents more easily); Larry Still, Judge Ponders Fate of Child
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Fainly
Chapter 266 expressly allows an adult stepparent of an adult to adopt
that adult.5 Chapter 266 also provides that once the adoption has taken
place, the legal parent-child relationship between the adult adoptee and the
birth parent, who is the spouse of the stepparent, remains unaffected by the
adoption.6
APW
Family; child and spousal support
Family Code § 4057 (amended).
SB 541 (Hart); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1156
Family Code § 4057.5 (new); § 4323 (amended).
SB 145 (Calderon); 1993 STAT. Ch. 935
Wanted by Mother, VANCOUVER SUN, June 25, 1993, at B3 (reporting the revocation of an adoption, despite the
fact that the birth mother failed to follow the laws regarding adoption revocation).
5. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9300(a) (amended by Chapter 266); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 220.20(s) (West Supp.
1993) (defining a stepparent adoption as when a stepparent adopts a child while one of the child's natural parents
maintains custody over the child); id. § 227.40 (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that when a stepparent adopts a
child, the written consent of at least one birth parent's must be given in the presence of a state official); cf. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600.4(3)(a) (Vest 1981) (declaring that a stepparent of a child is qualified to adopt a person other
than that stepparent's spouse); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-11(5) (1991) (providing that no agency employee is
required to conduct an investigation of the home or conditions prior to an adoption where the adoptee is an adult
or the adopting person is a stepparent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(B)(3) (Anderson 1989) (stating that
an adult may be adopted if the child, as a minor, has established a relationship with that child's stepparent and
agrees to be adopted). See generally Barbara Dafoe, Dan Quayle Was Right; Harnful Effects of Divorce on
Children, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993 (noting that unless a stepparent has adopted a stepchild, the stepparent
has no legal obligation towards the stepchild once the stepparent and the birth parent divorce).
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9306(b) (amended by Chapter 266); see CALIFORNIA SENATE JUDICIARY
COMmtTTEE, COmmITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 970, at 2 (May 18, 1993) (indicating that legislation is needed in
order to preserve the parent-child relationship between a natural parent and that parent's adult child once that
child is adopted by that parent's spouse who is not the child's biological parent); cf. IOWA CODE ANN, §
600.3(2)(a)-(b) (Vest 1981) (providing that a parent's rights need not be terminated prior to the filing of an
adoption petition if the stepparent of the adoptee is the petitioner); MICH. COWP. LAWs ANN. § 710.66(1) (West
1993) (providing that where an adult adoptee has been adopted by a stepparent and the adult adoptee's parent,
whose parental rights have been severed, wants to rescind the stepparent's adoption and restore his parental
privileges, a rescission petition must be filed with the probate court in the county where the adoption took place).
But see CAL. PROB. CODE § 6152(b) (West 1991) (stating that an adoptee is not considered a child of the
adoptive parent for inheritance purposes, unless the adoptee, as a minor, lived with that adoptive parent or that
parent's parent, brother, sister, or surviving spouse); but cf. Wilson v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1965) (holding that adult adoptees are not eligible to inherit their adoptive parent's property pursuant to
a will when that adoptive parent uses the word "children").
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Existing law provides a statewide uniform guideline for calculating
child support.' Current law also states that the amount reached under the
guideline is generally presumed correct, but may be rebutted by various
factors.2 Under prior law, the income of a parent's subsequent spouse or
nonmarital partner could be used to rebut the presumption that the amount
of support was correct.3
Chapter 935 provides that the income of a subsequent spouse or
nonmarital partner will not be considered, unless there is an extraordinary
case where excluding such income would create an extreme and severe
hardship.4
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4721 (a) (Vest Supp. 1993); see id. (explaining that the statewide uniform guideline
is determined by using a formula: CS=K[HN-(H%)(TN)]); id. § 4721(b)(1)(A) (providing that CS represents the
child support amount); id. § 4721(b)(1)(B) (providing that K represents the amount of income to be allocated
for child support); id. § 4721(b)(I)(C) (providing that HN represents the high eamer's net monthly disposable
income); id. § 4721(b)(l)(D) (providing that H% represents the approximate percentage of time that the high
earer will have physical custody); id. § 4721(b)(l)(E) (providing that TN represents the total net monthly
disposable income); see also § 4720(3)(A)-(L) (West Supp. 1993) (enumerating principles for courts to follow
when implementing the guideline); cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(14) (Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 514 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30 (West Supp 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (Michie Supp. 1992)
(describing the calculation of child support). See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Volnteers and Drafters: The
Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1472 (1991) (specifying that most child support
formulas allocate support in respect to each parent's income); Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of
Discretionary Justice in Family La': The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 224 (1991)
(providing that litigation of support payments should be quicker and less expensive when the courts use a
formula).
2. CAL. FAm. CODE § 4057 (amended by Chapter 1156); see id. § 4057(b) (amended by Chapter 1156)
(listing the following factors to be used to rebut the presumption that the amount reached is correct: (1) The
parties have stipulated to a different amount of child support; (2) the sale of the family residence has been
deferred and the rental value of the family residence where the child resides exceeds the mortgage payments,
homeowner's insurance and property taxes; (3) a parent's subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner has income
that helps meet that parent's basic living expenses, thus increasing the parent's disposable income available to
spend on the children; (4) the parent being ordered to pay child support has an extremely high income and the
amount of child support that would result from the formula exceeds the needs of the children; (5) a party is not
contributing to the needs of the child at a level commensurate with that party's custodial time; and (6)
application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate due to special circumstances in the particular case);
see also In re Marriage of Smith and Ostler, 223 Cal. App. 3d 33, 54, 272 Cal. Rptr. 560, 573 (1990) (stating
that the amount of child support is in the discretion of the trial court and will not be changed by an appellate
court unless, as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown); cf In re Marriage of Thornton, 802 P.2d 1194,
1195 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a trial court may not refuse to apply child support guidelines without
making appropriate findings that a deviation is justified); ln re Marriage of Ryswyk, 492 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support calculated as a
result of the guideline is correct).
3. 1992 Cal. Legis Serv. ch. 46, sec. 9, at 140 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4721).
4. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057.5(a)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 935); see id. § 4057.5(b) (enacted by
Chapter 935) (providing that if a parent voluntarily quits work, or reduces the parent's income it may be
considered an extraordinary case); id. § 4057.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 935) (providing that discovery for the
objective of determining income must be based on W2 and 1099 income tax forms subject to the discretion of
the court); id. § 4057.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 935) (providing that if the income of the parent's subsequent
spouse or nonmarital partner is considered, the court will allow a hardship deduction based on the stepchildren
of the party subject to the child support order); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
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Existing law provides there is a rebuttable presumption that there is a
decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is cohabiting5
with a person of the opposite sex.6 Chapter 935 provides that the income
of a supporting spouse's subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner will not
be considered as a factor in calculating or modifying spousal support.
TLS
Family; ex parte orders
Family Code § 246 (new).
AB 1331 (Epple); 1993 STAT. Ch. 148
Existing law mandates the procedure and requirements for obtaining an
ex parte' temporary restraining order for incidents of domestic violence.2
OF SB 145, at 2-3 (June 28, 1993) (stating that judges have discretion in whether to consider new mate income,
that counties vary in their treatment of this income, and that Chapter 935 is an effort to create uniformity in the
counties). There is a question whether it is better to allow the court discretion in special cases or whether it is
better to have predictable amounts of support. Id. at 3. One argument made in favor of attributing the new mate's
income to the obligee or obligor is that the additional income from a new mate may help pay some of the
household expenses of a support obligee or support obligor, thereby increasing the amount free for support of
the child. Id. at 3-4. Another argument in favor of attribution is that second mates must realize that they will
have to contribute to the support of their stepchildren. Id. at 4. The new mate may, however, also bring
additional expenses, and as such, would negate any basis for the finding that there is additional income available
for child support. Id. at 4. The new mate already may be directly contributing to the support of their
stepchildren, by paying for housing, clothing or food. Id. Since the new mate is not a party to the support action,
it may be argued that mandating a contribution constitutes a "taking" of the new mate's property without due
process. Id. at 5. The inclusion of the new mate's income may increase litigation costs since more discovery,
testimony, attorneys' time, and court time may be required. Id. In order to limit costs and the use of discovery
for the purpose of harassment, Chapter 935 confines the parameters of discovery to W2 and 1099 income tax
forms. Id.
5. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(2) (amended by Chapter 935) (stating that holding oneself out to be
husband or wife is not necessary to constitute cohabitation).
6. Id. § 4323(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 935).
7. Id. § 4323(b) (amended by Chapter 935). But see h, re Marriage of Tapia, 211 Cal. App. 3d 628, 629,
259 Cal. Rptr. 459, 460 (1989) (holding that the court must consider the non-marital partner's contributions to
the party subject to spousal support); I re Marriage of Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d 405, 410-12, 152 Cal. Rptr. 467,
470-71 (1979) (stating that the trial court did not err when it considered the combined income of a divorced
husband and his non-marital partner, in the determination of a child support order).
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990) (defining ex parte as meaning for one side only).
2. CAL. FAM. CODE § 240 (West Special Pamphlet 1993); see id. (providing that any order issued in
proceedings for dissolution, nullity, or legal separation, for spousal and child support during the pendency of
the proceeding, under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, or under the Uniform Parentage Act is subject to
the provisions of California Family Code §§ 240-246); id. § 2035 (West Special Pamphlet 1993) (providing that
an ex parte order may be issued by the court in a dissolution of marriage, nullity of a marriage, or for legal
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
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Chapter 148 requires that these orders be issued or denied on the day the
application is filed, or the following day if the application is filed too late
in the first day to permit effective review.3
SVB
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Civil Code §§ 25, 25.1, 25.5, 25.6, 25.7, 25.8, 25.9, 26, 27, 29, 33,
34, 34.5, 34.6, 34.7, 34.8, 34.9, 34.10, 35, 35a, 36, 36.1, 36.2, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 64, 65, 196.5, 221.07, 222.10, 222.71, 224.30,
224.64, 226.23, 226.69, 227.20, 227.40, 227.46, 227.50, 4100,
4200, 4202, 4203, 4204, 4206, 4208, 4210, 4213, 4216, 4357.5,
4359, 4370.5, 4372, 4373, 4384.5, 4390, 4390.3, 4602, 4612,
4700.11, 4702, 4760, 4761, 4762, 4763, 4764, 4765, 4766, 4767,
separation to: prevent a party from transferring or encumbering real or personal property; enjoin a person from
contacting or assaulting a person; exclude a person from a family dwelling; determine the custody of minor
children; or to determine the temporary use or possession of real or personal property); id. § 3600 (West Special
Pamphlet 1993) (providing that the court may order what is necessary for support of the husband, wife, or child
during the pendency of any proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties); id. §
5530 (,Vest Special Pamphlet 1993) (providing that a temporary restraining order may be granted, with or
without notice, for the purpose of preventing the recurrence of domestic violence); id. § 7700 (West Special
Pamphlet 1993) (providing that the court may issue a temporary restraining order in the summons of a
proceeding that seeks to establish a parent and child relationship that prohibits the parties from removing the
child from the state).
3. Id. § 246 (enacted by Chapter 148); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1331, at 2 (May 12, 1993) (stating that the purpose of Chapter 148 is to allow victims of
domestic violence to be able to rely on a temporary restraining order immediately, as they are often in danger
and unprotected while waiting for their orders); cf. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3624 (1989) (providing that
emergency orders of protection, written or orally, may be issued by a judge if a peace officer states that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is in immediate danger); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(1)
(Baldwin Supp. 1992) (providing that the court may issue a protective order upon review of a petition showing
that the petitioner is in immediate and present danger of domestic violence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A,
§ 4 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, the court may issue a
temporary restraining order, and may do so without notice if the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood
of immediate danger); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a), (f) (West Supp. 1993) (mandating that a judge must be
available to accept complaints and issue temporary restraining orders on weekends, holidays, and other times
when the court is closed, and that such orders may be issued when necessary to protect the victim). See
generally Chris Black, Judges Get More Calls on Domestic Abuse; New Law Spurs After-Hours Restraint
Requests, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 1991, at 13 (reporting that a significant increase in requests for restraining
orders occurred after a law was passed that required peace officers to inform victims of domestic violence of
their right to an immediate protective order); Davan Maharaj & Lynn Smith, More Victims of Domestic Abuse
Seeking Assistance; Violence: The Icrease is Part of an Escalation Seen Nationwide, According to the American
Medical Assn., L.A. TtMEs, June 22, 1992, at B1 (reporting that cases of domestic violence are increasing
nationwide); Michele Salcedo, Dark Foreboding; How Kathy Gennaine's Anxiety Hardened Into Fear,
NEWSDAY, July 27, 1992, at 5 (stating that a murder victim had tried to get a protective order against her
husband who had a history of violence, but was murdered by her husband a week later while waiting for a
hearing to have the order issued).
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4768, 4769, 4770, 4771, 4772, 4773, 4774, 4775, 4776, 4777,
4778, 4778.5, 4779, 4780, 4781, 4782, 4783, 4784, 4785, 4786,
4787, 4788, 4789, 4790, 4791, 4792, 4793, 4800.6, 4800.8, 4801,
5110.740, 5127, 5152, 5157, 5158, 7004, 7009, 7020 (repealed);
§ 1799.98 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure §§ 545.5, 547.7,
548, (repealed); §§ 128, 527.6, 529, 583.161, 699.560, 704.114,
704.160, 917.7, 1219, (amended); Evidence Code §§ 895.5, 1037.7
(repealed); Family Code §§ 55, 57, 60, 70, 75, 240, 242, 270, 271,
272, 273, 274, 275, 901, 2030, 2031, 2035, 2036, 2036.5, 2037,
2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2045, 2501, 2580, 2628,
3010, 3011, 3012, 3013, 3014, 3015, 3016, 3017, 3018, 3022,
3040, 3041, 3042, 3043, 3044, 3101, 3110, 3111, 3112, 3113,
3155, 3156, 3157, 3158, 3159, 3160, 3161, 3162, 3170, 3171,
3172, 3173, 3174, 3175, 3176, 3177, 3181, 3182, 3183, 3805,
4005, 4050, 4051, 4052, 4053, 4054, 4058, 4059, 4060, 4061,
4062, 4063, 4064, 4066, 4067, 4068, 4100, 4101, 4102, 4103,
4104, 4105, 4502, 5500, 5501, 5505, 5510, 5511, 5512, 5513,
5514, 5515, 5516, 5517, 5518, 5519, 5520, 5530, 5531, 5550,
5551, 5552, 5600, 5601, 5602, 5603, 5604, 5605, 5606, 5650,
5651, 5652, 5700, 5701, 5702, 5703, 5750, 5751, 5752, 5753,
5755, 5756, 5800, 5801, 5802, 5803, 5804, 5805, 5806, 5807,
7700, 7710, 7711, 7720, 7721, 7722, 7730, 7731, 7740, 7741,
7742, 7743, 7750, 8815, 20000, 20001, 20002, 20003, 20004,
20005, 20006, 20007, 20008, 20009, 20010, 20011, 20012
(repealed); §§ 58, 63, 105, 110, 240, 242, 270, 271, 272, 2030,
2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2040, 2041, 2045, 2047, 2049, 2120,
2121, 2123, 2124, 2126, 2128, 2129, 2581, 3010, 3011, 3021,
3029, 3030, 3031, 3040, 3041, 3042, 3043, 3103, 3110, 3111,
3112, 3113, 3114, 3115, 3116, 3160, 3161, 3162, 3163, 3164,
3170, 3171, 3172, 3173, 3175, 3176, 3177, 3178, 3179, 3181,
3182, 3183, 3184, 3185, 3186, 3557, 4050, 4051, 4052, 4053,
4054, 4058, 4059, 4060, 4061, 4062, 4063, 4064, 4066, 4067,
4068, 4069, 4070, 4071, 4072, 4073, 4074, 4075, 4502, 4733,
6200, 6201, 6203, 6205, 6209, 6211, 6215, 6218, 6220, 6221,
6222, 6223, 6224, 6225, 6226, 6227, 6240, 6241, 6250, 6251,
6252, 6253, 6254, 6255, 6256, 6257, 6270, 6271, 6272, 6273,
6300, 6301, 6302, 6303, 6304, 6305, 6320, 6321, 6322, 6323,
6324, 6325, 6326, 6340, 6341, 6342, 6343, 6344, 6345, 6360,
6361, 6380, 6381, 6382, 6383, 6384, 6385, 6386, 6387, 6388,
7502, 7503, 7504, 7505, 7506, 7507, 7611.5, 7700, 7710, 7720,
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7730, 7852, 8543, 8919, 20000, 20001, 20002, 20010, 20011,
20012, 20013, 20014, 20015, 20016, 20017, 20018, 20019, 20020,
20021, 20022, 20023, 20024, 20025, 20026, 20030, 20031, 20032,
20033, 20034, 20035, 20036, 20037, 20038, 20039, 20040, 20041,
20042, 20043 (new); §§ 2, 150, 213, 215, 231, 241, 243, 300, 306,
307, 357, 359, 360, 420, 422, 423, 425, 506, 510, 753, 853, 914,
915, 930, 1000, 1100, 1102, 1816, 1839, 1850, 2010, 2023, 2024,
2255, 2334, 2335, 2400, 2556, 2610, 2623, 2640, 3020, 3023,
3026, 3027, 3028, 3060, 3061, 3080, 3081, 3085, 3088, 3100,
3102, 3150, 3191, 3192, 3403, 3408, 3409, 3555, 3601, 3621,
3622, 3623, 3650, 3680, 3684, 3687, 3688, 3691, 3761, 3901,
3902, 3930, 4003, 4004, 4010, 4200, 4201, 4321, 4573, 4610,
4614, 4630, 4729, 4730, 4849, 5206, 5245, 5260, 6924, 7120,
7121, 7132, 7133, 7550, 7555, 7604, 7611, 7612, 7631, 7637,
7807, 7850, 7851, 7891, 8700, 8714, 8904, 9001, 9003, 9005, 9006
(amended); §§ 3021, 7500, 7501 (amended and renumbered);
Government Code §§ 21215, 26840.3, 26841, 75050 (amended);
Health and Safety Code §§ 10605, 11834.11 (amended); Penal
Code §§ 360, 1377, 11167, 11170, 12025.5, 14152 (amended);
Probate Code §§ 3072, 3073, 5022, 5030, 5305 (amended); Welfare
and Institutions Code §§ 304, 362.4, 366.2, 11476.1, 11478.1
(amended).
AB 1500 (Speier); 1993 STAT. Ch. 219
(Effective July 27, 1993)
The objective of Chapter 219 is to amend and recast existing
provisions under the Business and Professions Code, Civil Code, Code of
Civil Procedure, Education Code, Evidence Code, Government Code,
Health and Safety Code, Penal Code, Probate Code, Revenue and Taxation
Code, and Welfare and Institutions Code, which were amended or enacted
in 1992, to conform with the Family Code.'
Existing law prohibits domestic violence2 against specified persons.3
1. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1500, at 1 (April 21, 1993).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining domestic violence as abuse
committed against an adult or an emancipated minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former
cohabitant, or an individual with whom the offender has had a child or is having a child, or with whom the
offender has been engaged or dated); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6209 (enacted by Chapter 219) (stating that
a former cohabitant is a person who formerly lived in the home on a regular basis); id. (enacted by Chapter 219)
(defining a cohabitant as a person who normally lives in the home); People v. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d 993,
1000, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733-34 (1988) (defining cohabiting as a situation where an unrelated man and woman
live together in a substantial relationship which is, at a minimum, a permanent relationship of sexual or amorous
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Chapter 219 redefines domestic violence to include violence committed
against children.4
intimacy); People v. Ballard, 203 Cal. App. 3d 311, 317, 249 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1988) (holding that the
appellant was not denied his right to due process since the domestic violence statute, as applied to the appellant,
was not vague with respect to the word "cohabiting," where jt was established that the appellant and the victim
lived together for two years); Desiato v. Abbott, 617 A.2d 678, 681 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Civ. 1992) (finding that
the plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of an alleged victim of domestic violence under the
Domestic Violence Act as a "household member" where the plaintiff spent time with the defendant, occasionally
stayed overnight, kept personal items at the defendant's home, and dined with the defendant and his parents);
cf ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993) (defining domestic violence as a crime where the victim is a spouse,
former spouse, parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, member of the household, person not married to the
offender with whom the offender previously lived in a spousal-type relationship, or person with whom the
offender dated, courted, or was engaged).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(a) (amended by Chapter 219); see id. (providing that if a person willfilly
inflicts bodily harm upon a spouse, cohabitant, or a parent of the offender's child, resulting in a traumatic
condition, then the offender is guilty of a felony); see also id. § 7 (West 1988) (explaining that "willfully"
implies purposefully doing or not doing an act); id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a felony); id. § 273.5(c)
(amended by Chapter 219) (defining a traumatic condition as a wound or external or internal injury to the body
of either a serious or minor nature, resulting from physical force); People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 3d 944,
947, 217 Cal. Rptr. 616, 617 (1985) (upholding a conviction of a defendant who willfully and illegally inflicted
corporal injury upon his spouse, causing a traumatic condition); cf. ALA. CODE § 30-6-2 (1992) (recognizing
that individuals who abuse their children and spouses, as well as their victims, need to be treated); Alaska v,
Nelles, 713 P.2d 806, 810 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (holding that under Alaska law, the trial court has the
discretion to dismiss or prosecute a domestic violence case, and the defendant does not have a right to dismiss
the case); People v. Torres, 182 A.D.2d 653, 654, 581 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that
the evidence was not preserved for appellate review where the defendant failed to object to his laughter being
admitted into evidence in the case charging him with beating his wife with an iron), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d
1055, 596 N.E.2d 421, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1992); Ohio v. Mintz, 598 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(noting that where there are no previous convictions of domestic violence or assault, the defendant will be
charged with a misdemeanor for attempting domestic violence), appeal dismissed, 578 N.E.2d 823 (1991). See
generally Lauren L. McFarlane, Note, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When the Police
Will Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 929 (1991) (discussing the enhanced problem of domestic
violence when the police fail to respond, and discussing victims of domestic violence who bring actions against
the police departments and municipalities for violation of their rights to equal protection and due process of law);
Program to Curb Domestic Violence, N.Y. TtMEs, Oct. 8, 1992, at BI (reporting that Middlesex County, New
Jersey, is attempting to utilize the Abused Women's Active Response Program, in which a woman living with
a threat of domestic violence can press a panic button that is secretly relayed to police officers to inform them
that the woman is in danger).
4. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211(e) (enacted by Chapter 219); see id. § 6203 (enacted by Chapter 219)
(explaining that abuse means any of the following: (1) The intentional or reckless act of causing or attempting
to cause another person physical harm; (2) sexual assault; or (3) the act of putting a reasonable person in fear
of imminent serious physical harm to oneself or another person); id. § 621 l(a)-(f) (enacted by Chapter 219)
(defining domestic violence as abuse against a wife, husband, ex-wife, ex-husband, cohabitant, former cohabitant,
person with whom the accused has been engaged or dated, person with whom the accused has had a child, child
of a party or who is the subject of a suit filed under the Uniform Parentage Act, or any person who has a blood
relationship or is related by affinity to the accused within the second degree); In re Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th 295,
307, 851 P.2d 826, 833, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 551 (1993) (reinforcing the idea that the state has a compelling
interest in a child's welfare, and has an obligation to protect that interest); People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 294, 300,
792 P.2d 643, 645, 270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 613 (1990) (stating that according to statistics for 1988, there were
approximately 22,000 reported cases of child sexual abuse); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6205 (enacted by
Chapter 219) (providing that affinity, as applied to a married couple, means the relationship existing as a result
of a marriage between the parties and the blood relationships of those parties); cf Hall v. Van's Photo, Inc., 595
So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1992) (recognizing that the purpose of providing immunity to people who report
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Under existing law, a person who has been harassed5 may obtain a
temporary restraining order6 and an injunction7 against the harasser.'
Existing law requires that a petition for an injunction be heard by the court
within fifteen days.9 Chapter 219 mandates that if an ex parte't
temporary restraining order is issued under the Family Code, the matter
must be made returnable 1 within twenty days. 12
suspected child abuse under the Child Abuse Reporting Act is to alleviate the problem of child abuse and
neglect, and rejecting any challenge to the Act's constitutionality); Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala.
1989) (creating an exception to the parental immunity doctrine by holding that the doctrine does not bar suits
brought by minors against their parents for sexual abuse).
S. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b) (amended by Chapter 219) (defining harassment as routinely
acting in a knowing and willful manner towards another person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses that
person, and causes that person to experience significant emotional distress for no justifiable reason).
6. See Gray v. Bybee, 60 Cal. App. 2d 564, 571 (1943) (holding that the purpose of a temporary
restraining order is to maintain the status quo until a determination of the merits of the pending action).
7. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 525 (West 1979) (defining an injunction as a writ or order mandating
that a person refrain from doing a certain act).
8. Id. § 527.6(a) (amended by Chapter 219); see id. § 527 (West Supp. 1993) (setting out the
requirements for issuance of a temporary restraining order); id. § 527.6j) (amended by Chapter 219) (stating
that any person who violates a temporary restraining order will be subjected to punishment under Penal Code
§ 273.6); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6(a) (amended by Chapter 219) (providing that any person who intentionally
violates a protective or temporary restraining order, or an injunction, is guilty of a misdemeanor and subjected
to imprisonment in a county jail for up to a year, a fine of up to $1,000, or both); People v. Hernandez, 46 Cal.
3d 194, 199,757 P.2d 1013, 1015,249 Cal. Rptr. 850, 852 (1988) (stating that the trial court dismissed charges
of corporal injury on a cohabitant where it was uncertain whether the defendant and the victim were cohabitants
and whether a restraining order was in place at the time of the alleged assault); Caldwell v. Coppola, 219 Cal.
App. 3d 859, 861, 268 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454 (1990) (holding that a person protected by a temporary restraining
order cannot serve the alleged harasser since such a person is a party to the suit); cf. Oregon v. Hart, 708 P.2d
1137, 1137 (Or. 1985) (holding that a person who has violated a restraining order under the Abuse Prevention
Act is not permitted a jury trial); Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137, 138 (Or. 1983) (noting that the Abuse
Prevention Act mandates the arrest of a person who is suspected of violating a temporary restraining order). See
generally Sandy Shore, First, the Chickens Died; Then Denver Woman's Life Careened to Horror; Domestic
Violence: Stephanie Sund Got a Restraining Order to Protect Herself From Jeff Thomas. He Was Not Deterred;
He Shot Her as She Ran to the Police Station for Help, Order in Hand, L.A. TImES, May 16, 1993, at A4
(reporting that a former live-in boyfriend, who repeatedly abused and harassed his ex-girlfriend, shot her as she
fled to police headquarters, clutching a restraining order against the assailant).
9. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.6(d) (amended by Chapter 219).
10. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 241 (amended by Chapter 219) (requiring notice to the respondent unless it
can be shown that great or irreparable injury will result to the applicant before a hearing with notice can be
held).
11. See id. § 242 (enacted by Chapter 219); § 244 (West 1993) (providing that on the date the temporary
restraining order is returnable, the court shall conduct a hearing regarding issuance of a permanent order, and
the hearing shall take precedence, with certain exceptions, over all other matters on the calendar).
12. Id. § 242(a) (enacted by Chapter 219); see id. § 240(a)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 219) (stating that the
section of the Family Code concerning ex parte temporary restraining orders is applicable to the following
matters: (1) Dissolution or nullification of marriage, or legal separation of a married couple; (2) assets deposited
to assure child support payments in the future); (3) prevention of domestic violence; and (4) the Uniform
Parentage Act); id. § 242(a) (enacted by Chapter 219) (providing that a matter involving an order, requiring that
grounds be established as to why a permanent order should not be issued, may be heard within 25 days from
its issuance if the respondent shows good cause to the court); id. § 242(b) (enacted by Chapter 219) (providing
that if the matter is not heard within the allotted time period, a hearing may be held, although the order will be
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Existing law provides that both parents 3 are equally obligated to
support 14  their child 15  or children. 16  Chapter 219 includes certain
eligible adult children in laws regarding child support.
17
unenforceable unless it is re-issued).
13. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 241(e) (West 1982) (defining a parent as a biological or adoptive parent of
a child).
14. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 150 (amended by Chapter 219) (referring to support as a support obligation
owed to a child, spouse, or family).
15. See CAL- CIV. CODE § 241(d) (West 1982) (defining a child as a son or daughter who has not reached
the age of majority, or a son or daughter of any age who is not capable of earning a living and lacks sufficient
means).
16. Id. §§ 196,242 (West Supp. 1993); see CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(b) (enacted by Chapter 219) (stating
that a child's mother and father are mutually obligated to support that child); Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of
California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291,306 (1987) (noting that a mother and father of a child
are equally responsible for supporting that child); cf ALA. CODE § 12-15-9 (1986) (providing that if someone
other than a child's parents is granted custody of that child, the court may order the parents to pay a reasonable
amount of money to cover some or all of the support and treatment of that child); id. § 26-17-3 (1986) (noting
that a parent-child relationship exists regardless of whether or not the parents are married to one another); IOVA
CODE § 600B.1 (Snpp. 1993) (stating that a parent is responsible for that parent's illegitimate child's
maintenance, support, education, and funeral expenses); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.440 (Baldwin 1990) (setting
forth the items to be included in a notice of a monthly support obligation served upon an individual obligated
to support a child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-C:2(11) (1992) (defining "child support obligation" as that
amount that the parent is ordered to pay to the other parent in child support). But see Richards v. Gibson, 90
Cal. App. 3d 877, 881, 153 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1979) (providing that the custodial parent of a minor child is
primarily responsible for the child's support and education, unless a court order states otherwise), Carr v.
Marshman, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 195 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1983).
17. CAL. FAmt. CODE §§ 213(b)(3). 215, 2023(a), 2334(b), 2623(a)-(b), 3555, 3623, 3902, 3930, 4010
(amended by Chapter 219); see id. § 58 (enacted by Chapter 219) (defining a child for whom support may be
ordered as a child under the age of 18 or a child who is authorized to receive support pursuant to California
Family Code §§ 3587, 3901 and 3910); id. § 3587 (West 1993) (authorizing a court to make appropriate orders
to effectuate the stipulation of the parents to pay for the support of a child beyond the age of 18 years); id. §
3901 (amended by Chapter 219) (providing that a child's parent is obligated to support the child until that child
either finishes high school or reaches 19 years of age, as long as that child is not married, 18 years of age, a
full-time high school student, or not capable of supporting himself); id. § 3910 (Vest 1993) (stating the duty
of parents to maintain an incapacitated child of any age); Rebensdorf v. Rebensdorf, 169 Cal. App. 3d 138, 144,
215 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (1985) (suggesting that the court consider the following factors in deciding whether parents
are obligated to give their child a high school education: (1) Whether the adult child is attending school full
time; (2) whether the adult child is making progress toward graduating; and (3) the surrounding circumstances
as to why the adult child failed to graduate from high school before reaching majority); Kurtis J. Kearl, Note,
Turpin v. Sortini, Recognizing the Unsupportable Cause of Action for Vrongful Life, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1278,
1290-91 (1983) (stating that parents are obligated to support an adult child if that child is not capable of
supporting himself after reaching the age of majority); cf. Er parte Jones, 592 So. 2d 608, 609 (Ala. 1991)
(affirming that a father of an illegitimate child may be required to pay for an adttlt child's college education);
Er parte Brewington, 445 So. 2d 294, 296 (Ala. 1984) (stating that a non-custodial parent is obligated to support
that parent's adult child when the child is not capable of supporting himself due to a mental or physical
handicap); Bayliss v. Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 984, 986 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (holding that a parent has no legal
obligation to support an adult child, unless that child suffers from a physical or mental disability, or the obligor
parent has agreed otherwise); Parent Cannot Seek to Reduce Volhutari Obligation to Pay Tuition; Peterson v
Peterson, Supreme Court, 1A Part 18, Justice D. Saxe, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 18, 1992, at 21 (stating that
a parent may contractually agree to support an adult child). But see Jones v. Jones, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1013,
225 Cal. Rptr. 95, 96 (1986) (holding that a parent is not obligated to pay for an adult child's college education
if the child is neither physically nor mentally handicapped).
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Chapter 219 further mandates that the Judicial Council conduct
research on the effectiveness of current Family Law so that future public
policy can be molded accordingly.' 8
CAS/AP W
Family; family preservation services
Welfare and Institutions Code § 16500.8 (new); §§ 16500.5,
16500.7, 16501.1 (amended).
AB 776 (Hannigan); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1006
Existing law states that, in order to encourage the continuity of the
family unit,' services are to be provided through a family preservation
program 2 to families 3 whose children are at imminent risk of out-of-home
18. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1850(e) (amended by Chapter 219).
!. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1993) (declaring that the intent of the Legislature,
in enacting a code provision which places abused or neglected children under the jurisdiction of the court, is that
the protection of children shall focus on preservation of the family whenever possible); id. § 4242(a) (West
Supp. 1993) (defining families of persons with serious mental disorders as the children, spouses, siblings,
parents, grandparents, and grandchildren of such persons); id. § 18291 (West 1991) (defining family member,
in the domestic violence context, as any adult person who regularly resides in the household and has sexual
relations with another family or household member); In re Joanna Y., 8 Cal. App. 4th 433, 438, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d 422, 424 (1992) (describing the legal and societal preference for reunification of children with their natural
families); Adoption of Kay C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 741, 748-49, 278 Cal. Rptr. 907, 911 (1991) (describing the
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents and natural children in the family unit).
2. See CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 16500.5(b)(2)(3) (amended by Chapter 1006) (describing services
which may be part of a family preservation program, including counseling, mental health, and substance abuse
treatment, parenting, homemaking, respite, transportation, and family support services); id. § 16501G) (West
Supp. 1993) (defining family preservation services as services intended to avoid or limit out-of-home placement
of children); Mary Lee Allen, A Guide to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER
CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 575, 591-92 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (describing congressional deliberations prior
to passage of the federal Adoption Assistance Act, which outlined a necessary range of core services based on
testimony regarding successful preventive and reunification programs, including homemaker services, day care,
transportation, therapy, emergency caretakers and shelters, respite care, and consumer education (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 136, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47, 49 (1979)); Mark Hardin, Establishing A Core of Services for
Families Subject to State hitervention (A.B.A. Center on Children and the Law, Wash. D.C.), 1992, at 39
(describing the distinctive aspects of family preservation services as being highly concentrated, short-term,
delivered in-home, and highly flexible); cf Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
107 Stat. 312, § 13711 (defining family preservation services for purposes of amendments to the Social Security
Act for appropriating federal funds to qualified state family preservation programs); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325,




placement and who would receive AFDC-FC funds4 if placed out of their
homes.5 Chapter 1006 defines family preservation services, and in so
3. See h re Sara C., 8 Cal. App. 4th 964, 976, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 420 (1992) (finding that a
biological father, who is neither the presumed father nor was prevented by the mother from becoming the
presumed father, has no automatic right to reunification services when his child is placed in foster care); it re
Jodi B., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1322, 1326-29, 278 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245-46 (1991) (examining various statutory
definitions of parent, and holding that a stepparent is not entitled to reunification services); l re Jamie G., 196
Cal. App. 3d 675, 679, 241 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872 (1987) (denying reunification rights to the de facto parents of
a child in foster care), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988).
4. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11400-11409 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth the
eligibility and placement requirements for receipt of federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Foster
Care [AFDC-FC] funds); see also id. § 11450(d) (West Supp. 1993) (describing the process for computing the
amount of grants under AFDC-FC programs); id. §§ 15150-15154 (West 1991) (describing the process for
payment of state and federal grants by states to counties for public assistance); cf. Mary McGrory, Defending
Mommy Dearest, WASH. POST, July 25, 1993, at CI (describing an Illinois bill which would prohibit persons
who have physically or sexually abused their child from receiving family preservation funds without a court
hearing).
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5(a)(1)(A) (amended by Chapter 1006); see Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a
(1988 & Supp. 111990)) (providing, at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), that a state which receives AFDC-FC funds must
have a plan which makes reasonable efforts to prevent or shorten the duration of the out-of-home placement);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5(b)(3)(A)-(F) (amended by Chapter 1006) (describing the statutory
classifications under which families qualify for family preservation services, including having children who are
abused or neglected, disobedient, truant or engaging in criminal activity, or who are severely emotionally
disturbed); Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1369-70 n.15 (1992) (finding that Congress intended the states
to have broad discretion in deciding how to implement family reunification requirements for receipt of federal
AFDC-FC funds); S. REP. NO. 96-336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450,
1452 (declaring that one of the major features of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 was
to alter the structure of law by de-emphasizing foster care placements and encouraging permanent placement for
children by providing services, either to return children to their homes, or to place them in adoptive homes); 45
C.F.R. §§ 1356.21(b), (d)(4), 1357.15(e)(2) (1992) (listing various reunification services which may satisfy the
"reasonable efforts" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11401,
11402 (West Supp. 1993) (describing conditions and facilities required for eligibility for AFDC-FC funding);
cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-116 (Supp. 1993) (authorizing the appointment of a Placement Alternatives
Commission to prepare a plan for provision of services designed to prevent or reduce out-of-home placements);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para. 5/8.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing for the development of a service plan upon
obtaining credible evidence of abuse or neglect, which must identify available family preservation services); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (West 1992) (setting forth the family reunification responsibilities of the
Department of Human Services and of the parents of children ordered into custody of the Department); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1992) (declaring the need to preserve or reunite families as the
state's first obligation); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2151.01(C) (Anderson 1990) (explaining that one of the
purposes of the Juvenile Court section of Ohio law is to avoid the separation of children from parents, except
when necessary for the welfare of the child or in the interests of public safety). See generaly Allen, supra note
2, at 575; Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost Generation": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 593 (1992) (asserting the need for private
enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act against states which do not comply with the
federal framework for foster care systems); Debra Ratterman, et al., Reasonable Efforts to Prevent Foster
Placement, 1987 A.B.A. NAT'L LEGAL RESOURCE CM. FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (providing
guidance to states which must meet the reasonable efforts standard of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) in order to receive
federal AFDC-FC funding).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Family
doing, expands the guidelines for determination of eligibility to receive
family preservation services.6
Existing law provides that any county which conducts a family
preservation program, may claim a portion of the state's share of that
county's AFDC-FC funds in advance.' These funds are to be expended for
children declared dependents of the courts as a result of neglect or abuse.8
Chapter 1006 adds to the portion of AFDC-FC funds which a county may
claim, those funds to be expended for children declared dependents of the
court as a result of disobedience, truancy, or criminal behavior.9
Existing law contains a non-exclusive list of services which may be
provided under a family preservation program.' Chapter 1006 adds
family support services" to that list.12
Existing law provides that a family preservation program will be
deemed successful if it meets specified standards, aimed at avoiding or
6. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5(a)(l)(A)(ii)(1)-(IlI) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. §
16500.5(a)(l)(A)(ii)(II)-(Ill) (expanding the scope of the family preservation program to include children who
would spend longer periods of time in out-of-home placement, or would be placed in a more restrictive out-of-
home placement, without the provision of family preservation services).
7. See id. § 16500.5(b)(1)(A)(iii) (amended by Chapter 1006) (allowing for a claim of up to 25% of the
state's projected share of AFDC-FC funds to be spent for abused or neglected children). Each program year's
projection is based on AFDC-FC expenditures for the previous five years. Id. § 16500.5(b)(1)(A)(iv) (amended
by Chapter 1006).
8. Id. § 16500.5(c)(l)(A)(iii) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. §§ 300, 301, 360, 361, 364 (West
Supp 1993) (describing the statutory processes for determining and protecting children subject to abuse or
neglect); id. § 16500.5(c)(1 )(A)(iii) (amended by Chapter 1006) (providing that the amount of the projected share
is to be based upon AFDC-FC funds spent for children subject to California Welfare and Institutions Code §§
300, 301, 360, 361, and 364). But see LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT IN CALIFORNIA 48-49 (Jan. 1991) (finding that the programs which permit counties to divert a
portion of their AFDC-FC funds to family preservation services are effective for some families, but are probably
too expensive to be cost-effective for a large number of families).
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500(c)(1)(A)(iii) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. §§ 601, 602
(West 1984) (describing the statutory processes for determining and protecting children who are disobedient,
truant, or engaging in criminal activity); id. § 16500(c)(1)(A)(iii) (amended by Chapter 1006) (providing that
the amount of the projected share is to be based upon AFDC-FC funds spent for children subject to California
Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 601, 602, 726, and 727).
10. Id. § 16500.5(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 1006).
11. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, § 13711
(defining family support services as community-based services designed to increase parenting skills, create a
stable family environment, and enhance child development); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(h) (West Supp.
1993) (defining family support services for purposes of the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act
[California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 4500-4519] as services provided to a developmentally disabled
child and the child's family to assist the family in its endeavors to reside together); see also id. § 16501(g)-(h)
(West Supp. 1993) (defining family maintenance and family reunification services).
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. § 16500.5(b)
(amended by Chapter 1006) (finding that California's family preservation programs conform to recent federal
initiatives found at Public Law 103-66). See generally LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 8, at 9
(describing the role of family maintenance and family reunification programs in the overall Child Welfare
Services Program of the State of California).
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reducing the length of stay in out-of-home placement. 3 Chapter 1006
adds two standards to the list of criteria for success.
14
Existing law provides that a county which has been operating a family
preservation program for three consecutive years may request a permanent
transfer of General Fund money 15 from out-of-home placement services
to family preservation services for children declared dependents of the
court as a result of abuse or neglect. 6 Chapter 1006 provides that, if a
county served children declared dependents of the state as a result of
disobedience, truancy, criminal activity, or severe emotional disturbance
17
during the three year period prior to the request for permanent funds, the
county may continue to serve such children after the permanent transfer.' 8
Chapter 1006 also permits a county to apply for a supplemental permanent
13. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5(b)(7)(A)-(C) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. (defining
success based on percentages of children who remain at home six months, one year, or two years after
termination of services, and based on a 50% decrease in the length of stay in out-of-home placements of children
who receive services versus children who do not); ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON HUMAN SERVICES, COImITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 776, at 3 (April 14, 1993) (reporting that Contra Costa County claims a $2.6 million savings
in fiscal year 1991-92, San Diego County a $2.5 million savings as of February 1993, Santa Clara County a $1.5
million savings, and Sacramento County an annualized $3.8 million savings because of family preservation
services). Counties also report success in the percentages of children who remain in the home after family
preservation services are terminated. Id.; see also Katherine Ames, et al., Fostering the Family, NEWSWEEK, June
22, 1992, at 64 (describing several examples of successful family preservation programs across the country);
Robert Keough, Experts Question Program Budgeting, II B. Bus. J., No. 50, Feb. 3, 1992, at § 1, p. 1
(describing the budgetary pressures forcing municipalities to move away from foster care and toward family
preservation services). But see LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 8, at 25 (asserting that although four
out of five children who complete the Family Reunification Program return to their families, the growth in foster
care exceeds reunifications; for example, in 1985-86, about 22% of children in foster care were reunited with
their parents, but the percentage was below 18% in 1988-89); Elizabeth Bartholet, Parental Rights That Wrong
Children, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 17, 1993, at B7 (asserting that family preservation program supporters are
gauging success in terms of numbers of biological families which are kept intact, without taking into account
the potential harm done to children who are left in abusive family situations); Mona Charen, Priorii' 1: Take
Care of Children, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., July 6, 1993, at A7 (claiming that family preservation services,
which count victories only in terms of the number of out-of-home placements avoided, are actually leaving many
children in harmful and sometimes fatal family situations); Celia W. Dugger, Program to Preserve Families
Draws Child-Velfare Debate, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 6, 1993, at Al (describing recent studies which suggest that,
despite claims of success, family preservation programs are at best benign).
14. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.5(c)(6)(A)-(B) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. (adding the
criteria that: (I) Families become able to resolve their own problems, utilize services, and advocate for their
children; and (2) family functioning becomes enhanced by building on family strengths).
15. See id. §§ 15150-15154 (West 1991) (describing the payment of state and federal grants to counties
by states).
16. Id. § 16500.7(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. §§ 300, 301, 361, 364 (West Supp. 1993)
(describing the statutory processes for determination and protection of children subject to abuse or neglect).
17. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7572.5 (Vest Supp. 1993) (describing the process of evaluation and
assessment for determining whether out-of-home placement is appropriate for a severely emotionally disturbed
child); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601, 602 (West 1984) (describing the statutory processes for identifying
and protecting children who are disobedient, truant, or engaging in criminal activity).
18. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500.7(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 1006).
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transfer of funds in order to serve additional populations not served in the
prior three year period. 9
Chapter 1006 requires the Department of Social Services20 to seek
permanent federal funding for family preservation services. 1 If funding
is not obtained prior to January 1, 1997, the provision for permanent
transfer of AFDC-FC funds from out-of-home placement programs to
family preservation services becomes inoperative. 22 Chapter 1006 further
requires the Department of Social Services to seek federal funds for the
family preservation program to supplement the amounts transferred from
AFDC-FC funds.23
Existing law establishes a time frame for completion of a written case
plan.24 Chapter 1006 modifies one of the determinants for completion of
the case plan.25
CAS
19. Id. § 16500.7(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 1006).
20. See id. §§ 10550-10618 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (defining the organization, powers, and duties
of the State Department of Social Services).
21. Id. § 16500.7(0(2) (amended by Chapter 1006).
22. Id. § 16500.7(0(3) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. (providing that if this section becomes
inoperative on January 1, 1997, it is subsequently repealed as of January 1, 1998, unless a statute is enacted
deleting or extending such dates).
23. Id. § 16500.8 (enacted by Chapter 1006); see id. § 16500.8(a)(1)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 1006)
(describing potential sources for additional federal funding, including AFDC and child welfare aid programs,
foster care and adoption assistance aid programs, and medical assistance programs).
24. Id. § 16501.1(d) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. § 356 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring a hearing
to determine whether a minor is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court); id. § 16501.1(b) (amended by
Chapter 1006) (requiring that a case plan document the preplacement needs of the family, the services provided,
and efforts made to prevent out-of-home placement); id. § 16501.1(d) (amended by Chapter 1006) (requiring
completion of the case plan by the first occurence of either: (1) Within 30 days of initial removal of the child
from the home; (2) within 30 days of an in-person response if the child is not removed from the home; or (3)
by the date of the jurisdictional hearing pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 356).
25. Id. § 16501.1(d) (amended by Chapter 1006); see id. § 358 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that after
the court has determined that a minor is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to California




Family Code § 8812 (new); § 8800 (amended).
SB 255 (Boatwright); 1993 STAT. Ch. 450
Under existing law, it is unethical for an attorney to represent both the
prospective adoptive parents and the birth parents of a child in negotiations
or any proceedings in connection with an adoption unless a written consent
is received from both parties.'
Chapter 450 requires that an attorney representing the prospective
adoptive parents in an independent adoption2 must inform them in writing
that the birth parents can change their minds and that any money expended
in connection with negotiations surrounding the adoption are not
1. CAL. FAMi. CODE § 8800(d) (amended by Chapter 450). See generally Pamela K. Strom Amlung,
Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Independent Adoptions: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 169
(1990) (discussing the potential problems arising from the representation of both the birth and prospective
adoptive parents by the same attorney in an independent adoption and noting that such difficulties may be
overcome; further noting that it is important that the attorney ensure that the birth mother have an opportunity
to make a free, choice, uninfluenced by the attorney or the potential adoptive parents).
2. See Sharon Fast Gustafson, Regulating Adoption htermediaries: Ensuring that the Solutions are no
Worse than the Problem, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 837, 842 (1990) (defining independent adoption as an
adoption arranged without the assistance of an adoption agency, usually through a facilitator such as an attorney
and noting that their are two types of independent adoption: (1) Direct placement, in which the birth parents and
adoptive parents know of each other prior to the adoption and arrange the adoption without any intermediary;
and (2) private placement, in which the birth parents and adoptive parents are brought together by an adoption
intermediary); id. at 851-54 (discussing the value of independent adoption and noting that independent adoptions
are usually more open, thereby increasing the ease with which an adoptee can later trace his or her birth parents,
independent adoptions increase a child's chance of being adopted and allow the birth mother some choice in
deciding who will parent her child).
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reimbursable.3 Chapter 450 also requires that the prospective adoptive
parents sign a statement indicating that they understand this information.4
Existing law provides that prospective adoptive parents must file with
the court a full accounting report of all disbursements made, or alleged to
be made, on their behalf in connection with the adoption proceedings.5
Chapter 450 provides that any request by the birth parents for payment
by the prospective adoptive parents of various fees and expenses must be
in writing.6 The birth parents must provide the prospective adoptive
parents with written receipts which are to be provided to the court when
the accounting report is filed.7
JLM
3. CAL. FAm. CODE § 8800(h) (amended by Chapter 450); see In re Zachariah, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1025,
1037, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 434 (1992) (granting the adoptive parents custody of a child who was the subject of
an independent adoption when the birth mother changed her mind, but noting that this was because the birth
mother had no remedy in the California courts and might be successful should she bring a suit in Oregon courts);
In re Timothy W., 223 Cal. App. 3d 437, 441, 272 Cal. Rptr. 906, 907 (1990) (holding that in California, when
a natural mother refuses consent to an independent adoption within a reasonable time after placing the child with
prospective adoptive parents, the court must grant custody to the birth mother); id. (noting that six months is
always a reasonable time in which the mother may change her mind and refuse to go through with the adoption);
In re Baby Boy M., 221 Cal. App. 3d 475, 487, 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 34 (1990) (granting a teenage mother custody
of her child when she decided she did not wish to go through with an independent adoption but the prospective
adoptive parents refused to surrender the infant); H.M.G. v. Goforth, 606 N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ind. 1993) (holding
that where pre-birth consent is given for adoption, it is voidable and such consent must be ratified by a post-birth
act which manifests a present intention to give the child up for adoption); see also SENATE COMMITrEE ON
JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 255, at 2 (May 11, 1993) (noting that SB 255 is based upon two non-
controversial portions of the 1991 SB 717, which was unsuccessful); SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF SB 717 at
2-3 (May 6, 1991) (reporting that the average cost of an independent adoption is $8000, but couples in California
can spend as much as $25,000 in such proceedings, depending upon medical complications and how early in
the pregnancy they begin to help the mother); id. (noting that there were approximately 3,000 independent
adoptions in California in 1990 as opposed to 2,000 agency adoptions and that this difference is due largely to
the perception that agency adoptions take too long); id. (suggesting that SB 255 was inspired by a Walnut Creek
couple who spent $8,000 on an independent adoption that fell through and found that they had no legal
recourse).
4. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8800(h) (amended by Chapter 450); see SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 255, at 2 (Aug. 23, 1993) (suggesting that the purpose of SB 255 is to ensure that prospective
adoptive parents are sufficiently advised of the risks involved in independent adoptions); Sharon Fast Gustafson,
Regulating Adoption hItennediaries: Ensuring that the Solutions are no Worse than the Problem, U. CIN. L.
REV. 837, 865 (1990) (advising that independent adoption should be regulated only so far as the regulation
provides a direct benefit to both of the adoption parties).
5. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610 OVest 1994).
6. Id. § 8812 (enacted by Chapter 450); see id. (stating that the request may be for attorney's, medical
and counseling fees, or the living expenses of the birth mother).
7. Id. § 8812 (enacted by Chapter 450); see SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB
255, at 2 (Aug. 23, 1993) (noting that SB 255 demands an accounting through requiring documentation and





Family Code §§ 20100, 20101, 20102, 20103, 20104 (repealed); §§
7570, 7571, 7572, 7573, 7574, 7575, 7576, 7577 (new).
AB 1277 (Archie-Hudson); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1240
Existing law allows the mother, the child or the presumed father' to
bring a court action for the purpose of establishing paternity. Prior law
created a pilot program in three counties whereby paternity could be
established when the mother and the presumed father executed a
declaration administered by the hospital where the child was born.
Chapter 1240 implements the program statewide, permitting paternity
to be voluntarily acknowledged by the execution of a declaration4 by the
mother and the presumed father administered at all hospitals and clinics.5
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1993) (setting forth conditions that establish
fatherhood by a rebuttable presumption); CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, living with his wife, is conclusively presumed to be the father of any child to
which the wife gives birth); id. § 621(h) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that the meaning of presumed father is
the same as set forth in California Civil Code § 7004).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West Supp. 1993); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(1)-(4) (West 1983)
(setting forth the conditions for determining if a man is the natural father of a child).
3. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 849, sec. 2, at 1411-13 (enacting CAL. EvID. CODE § 621.1).
4. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7574(a)-(i) (setting forth the required content of the declaration in order for
it to establish a conclusive presumption of paternity).
5. Id. § 7571 (enacted by Chapter 1240); see id. § 7571(a) (enacted by Chapter 1240) (providing that
upon any live birth, the hospital will attempt to provide a declaration to the natural mother and the man
identified by her to be the natural father, and if completed, the person responsible for registering the birth will
file the declaration). Chapter 1240 requires the District Attorney to pay $10 to the filing hospital, clinic, or other
place of birth for each declaration. See id. § 7576(a) (enacted by Chapter 1240) (providing that declarations not
filed at the place of birth may be registered at the State Office of Vital Statistics any time after the child is
born); see OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 14 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, NO. 8 at 1-2 (1992) (copy
on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (discussing the success of Virginia's voluntary paternity acknowledgement
program); OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 13 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, NO. 10 at 1-3 (1991) (copy
on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (discussing both the effectiveness and the benefits of obtaining voluntary
paternity acknowledgements during the time immediately following the child's birth); SENATE COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1277, at 3 (Aug. 17, 1993) (expressing the need for voluntary
establishment of paternity to reduce the great amount of time and money spent on the process of determining
paternity by judicial proceedings, and to encourage paternity to be established in more cases); Report on
Washington State Voluntary Paternity Acknowledgment Process (Mar. 12, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific
Law Journal) (describing the success of the Washington voluntary paternity program which has resulted in
acknowledgment of paternity by the fathers of approximately 40% of the children born out of wedlock in the
state). The number of paternities established voluntarily has risen from 2,042 to 10,197 in three years. Id.;
Memorandum from the Harry W. Wiggins, Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Social Services to Larry
D. Jackson (October 30, 1991) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (reporting statistics on the cost
effectiveness of the state voluntary paternity project which saved a total of $115,280 for the four participating
hospitals); cf VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (Michie Supp. 1993) (providing that a parent child relationship between
a child and a man may be established by the execution of a written statement); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.58.080 (West 1992) (requiring that the person who delivers a child to an unwed mother shall provide the
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Paternity established by execution of a declaration creates a rebuttable
presumption of paternity which may be challenged within three years of
the execution of the declaration.6 Chapter 1240 exempts any health care
provider from liability for a negligent act pertaining to the accuracy of the
information.7
SMK
Family; visitation rights for grandparents
Family Code § 3104 (new); § 3103 (amended).
SB 306 (Lockyer); 1993 STAT. Ch. 832
Under existing law, the court has jurisdiction to award visitation rights
to a grandparent if the court determines that such visitation is in the best
interest of the child.'
mother and natural father with an affidavit, within 10 days of the birth, for the purpose of acknowledging the
paternity of the child).
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575 (enacted by Chapter 1240); see id. § 7575(b) (enacted by Chapter 1240)
(stating that a presumption created under this section overrides all presumptions except for those created by
California Family Code § 7540).
7. Id. § 7571(a) (enacted by Chapter 1240).
I. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3103(a) (amended by Chapter 832); see id. § 3021 (West Special Pamphlet 1993)
(discussing the court's power in proceedings in which the custody of a child is at issue); id. § 3022 (West
Special Pamphlet 1993) (enumerating the factors the court must consider in determining the best interest of a
child); cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-117 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986)
(permitting visitation to anyone); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125A.330 (1993)
(permitting visitation for relatives); N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:2-7.1 (West 1993) (granting grandparents visitation
rights); State ex rel. Grant v. Keegan, 836 P.2d 167, 169 (Or. 1992) (holding that a statute permitting a
grandparent to obtain visitation rights did not apply to the paternal grandfather of a child adopted by the
mother's husband after the father's death). See generally Miriam B. Chaloff, 49 Grandparents' Statutory
Visitation Rights and the Rights of Adoptive Parents, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 149 (1982) (reporting that most
states with grandparent visitation statutes only allow a visitation action to be brought when a parent has died
and the parents of the deceased wish to continue their relationship with the child); Judith L. Shandling, The
Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 118 (1986) (arguing
that parental rights limit the situations which grandparents may constitutionally be granted visitation rights);
ASSEMBLY COMMITIE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 306, at 2 (Feb. 17, 1993) (stating that in
California 500,000 children are raised by their grandparents and that most of the grandparents do not have
custody or legal guardianship over these children).
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Chapter 832 provides that the court may grant visitation rights2 to a
grandparent if the grandparent petitions the court? Chapter 832 also
provides that a petition may not be filed while the natural or adoptive
parents are married unless certain circumstances exist.4 Chapter 832
further provides that a grandparent must provide notice of the petition to
each of the child's parents, any stepparent, and any person who has
physical custody of the child.5 A visitation order issued to a grandparent
shall not create a basis of change for the residence of the child.6 Under
Chapter 832, the court has the discretion to appropriate the percentage of
visitation awarded to the grandparent between the parents, for the
calculation of child support.7 Chapter 832 also provides that the court has
the discretion to order a parent or a grandparent to pay the other for
support8 of the child.9
TLS
2. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(e) (enacted by Chapter 832) (providing that there is a rebuttable
presumption against awarding visitation rights to grandparent if the parents of the child agree that the
grandparent should be denied visitation rights). See generally Michael J. Minerva, Jr., Grandparent Visitation:
The Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their "Bundle of Joy," 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 533, 533 (1991)
(analogizing parental rights to a "bundle of sticks" and examining how Florida courts take "sticks" away from
single parents).
3. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(a) (enacted by Chapter 832); see id. (stating that the court must: (1) Find
that there is a preexisting relationship between the grandparent and the grandchild, demonstrating that visitation
would be in the best interest of the child; and (2) balance the interest of a grandparent's interest in having
visitation rights against the parent's right to exercise their parental authority); id. § 3104(g) (enacted by Chapter
832) (stating that visitation rights may not be awarded if the award would conflict with a right of custody or
visitation of a birth parent who is not a party to the petition proceeding).
4. Id. § 3104(b) (amended by Chapter 832).
5. Id. § 3103(c) (amended by Chapter 832); see id. (requiring notice to be given by certified mail, return
receipt requested, postage prepaid to the person's last known address); In re Massengill, 601 N.E.2d 206, 209
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to make joinder of grandparents mandatory in a dependency proceeding on the
basis of insufficient visitation rights); In re Steven C., 486 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
paternal grandparents had to be notified and given an opportunity to be heard under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act).
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3103(f) (amended by Chapter 832); see id. (stating that a visitation order shall
be one of the factors considered when ordering a change of residence).
7. Id. § 3103(g)(1) (amended by Chapter 832).
5. See id. § 3103(g)(2) (amended by Chapter 832) (defining support).
9. Id.
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